The ECB’s decision to toughen its stance on Greece signals the end of the Greek government’s honeymoon period by Monastiriotis, Vassilis
07/02/2015
The ECB’s decision to toughen its stance on Greece signals the
end of the Greek government’s honeymoon period
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/02/07/the-ecbs-decision-to-toughen-its-stance-on-greece-signals-the-end-of-the-greek-governments-honeymoon-period/
The European Central Bank (ECB) has announced that it will no longer accept Greek government
bonds as collateral for lending money to commercial banks. Vassilis Monastiriotis writes on how
the decision should be interpreted in light of the current discussions surrounding Greek debt. He
notes that while the immediate eﬀect on the Greek economy is not particularly serious, the decision
nevertheless signals the end of the honeymoon period for the Greek government and gives an
indication of the tough negotiations which are set to follow.
The European Central Bank’s decision on 4 February to suspend the waiver for the acceptance of
Greek government bonds as loan collaterals came as a shock to Greece, but it was rather more expected by the
ﬁnancial markets (although this does not preclude a strong ‘market reaction’). The decision per se does not have
immediately dire consequences for the Greek economy. It raises the cost of borrowing for Greek banks (from 0.05
per cent to 1.5 per cent) but it doesn’t stop their access to liquidity, as this will continue to be provided by the Bank of
Greece through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) mechanism.
The decision is moreover rather sensible from the point of view of central bank ﬁnance, as Greece indeed cannot be
assumed to be in an adjustment programme given the recent pronouncements of the Greek government following its
election on 25 January. It should be recalled that the European Central Bank accepted Greek bonds as collaterals,
which are not credit-worthy in a market-rating sense, solely on the basis of the implicit guarantee by the Eurogroup
that Greece’s solvency is guaranteed as long as the country remains in an adjustment programme.
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On a ﬁrst reading, this decision is above all of political
value and signiﬁcance, representing a strong message
by the ECB that Greece should work swiftly and with
pragmatism towards a new (or old) agreement with its
Eurozone partners. On a second reading, the message
may have multiple recipients, including ones in Germany
and elsewhere, signalling to all sides that failure to reach
a political agreement will not be ‘accommodated’ with
technical rescues by the ECB – the Greek government
certainly favours this interpretation.
But I think there is more to this than that. One should not
forget that the ECB itself is largely divided on the issue of
Greece and of monetary accommodation more generally.
Those in its Executive Board that are more amenable to
accommodation and have a more forgiving or favourable stance towards Greece, have to battle with those who see
the ECB’s activism as an unacceptable departure from its constitutional role and mandate.
Under this prism, there is a battle brewing inside the ECB and the decision made on 4 February was not the time for
its executive members to open up their cards and pick up ﬁghts. The decision by the ECB maintains its adherence
to consensual decision-making, strengthens its credibility with regard to non-politicisation and rules-based policy-
making, and gives it space and more degrees of freedom for future decisions concerning the handling of the Greek
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crisis.
For the Greek government, however, which of these interpretations carries more water makes little diﬀerence. The
ECB decision signals the end of the short-lived honeymoon period and the optimism created by the rather positive
climate in many of the meetings of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis with oﬃcials
in France, Italy and Brussels. As Syriza had already anticipated, tough negotiations lie ahead for the Greek
government. And the going has just started to get tough. But it is the realists, not the tough, that should now get
going…
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article originally appeared at the Greece@LSE blog and gives the views of the author, not the position of
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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